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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.:
Pernission for Journalists to
"Quote What I Mean, Not What I Say"
I. INTRODUCTION
"Write what I mean, not what I say!" was the exhortation Lyndon
Johnson gave reporters on numerous occasions during the course of his
presidency.' How pleased the former President would have been to
learn that on June 20, 1991, the Supreme Court of the United States
gave news reporters permission to do just that.' In Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc.,' the Court held that a reporter's deliberate al-
teration of a public figure's statement does not constitute actual mal-
ice" unless the alteration materially changes the meaning of the
speaker's actual words.' However, in so ruling, the Court refused to
accept the Ninth Circuit rule that allowed publishers to misquote a pub-
lic plaintiff as long as the altered quote was a "rational interpretation"
of the speaker's ambiguous statements.'
Masson arose out of a series of interviews that Janet Malcolm, a writ-
er for The New Yorker, conducted with Jeffrey Masson, a noted psycho-
analyst and projects director of the Sigmund Freud Archives.' When
The New Yorker published Malcolm's article, Masson claimed that
Malcolm's use of quotation marks attributed to him certain words and
statements that he had never said.' He contended that these inaccura-
1. Slade Metcalf, He Said, She Said, 'Get It on Tape or Go to Trial' Is the Mes-
sage from a Recent Supreme Court Decision on Reformatting Quotes, FOLIO: THE
MAG. FOR MAG. MGMT., Sept. 1, 1991, at 108.
2. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
3. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
4. For the meaning of "actual malice," see inTfra notes 87-95 and accompanying
text
5. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433. The Court held that "[a] deliberate alteration of the
words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity ... unless the
alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement" Id.
6. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "[m]alice will not be inferred from
evidence showing that the quoted language does not contain the exact words used by
the plaintiff provided that the fabricated quotations are. . . 'rational interpretations'
of ambiguous remarks made by a public figure." Id.
7. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2424.
8. Id. at 2425-28. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (describing six
cies damaged his reputation amongst his professional peers and the
general public.' Malcolm, however, argued that by reporting her inter-
pretation of the Masson interviews, she simply represented a journalist
exercising her right to report the news, inform the public, and write
creatively, yet honestly, without judges, lawyers, and the courts block-
ing her efforts."0
As the Masson case moved through the federal court system, the
arguments on both sides illustrated the inherent tension between two
fundamental interests that conflict in many defamation suits. On the
one hand, there is the plaintiffs right to redress for any damage that
false publications inflict on his reputation." On the other hand, there is
the media's right to inform society, and society's right to be informed,
of public issues in order to create an environment conducive to "unin-
hibited, robust and wide-open" debate and discussion, free from the
constant threat of a lawsuit.' Masson is more than a case about false
quotations. It is the latest chapter, and the Court's most recent ruling,
on how to balance these two competing interests.
This Note begins by analyzing the establishment and historical devel-
opment of the Court's actual malice standard. Part II describes both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Masson. Part III analyzes the deci-
sion and explains why the majority's standard for false quotations is
superior to the standards proposed by the dissent, the petitioner, and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finally, this Note describes and
analyzes the possible impacts of Masson in the areas of journalism, law,
and academics.
quotes that Masson claimed were false and defamatory).
9. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425. "'[Masson] emerges gradually, as . . . mean-spirited,
self-serving, full of braggadocio, impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a self-destructive
fool.'" Id, (quoting Coles, Preudianism Confronts Its MakContents, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 27, 1984, at 58, 60).
10. Although no majority of the Supreme Court has ever held that the "Press
Clause" contained in the First Amendment gives the media greater First Amendment
protection than members of the general public, Justice Stewart consistently found that
the Press Clause created "a fourth institution outside the government as an additional
check on the three official branches." LoCKHART ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CAsES-
COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1008 (5th ed. 1980). However, "some tension necessarily exists
between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in
redressing wrongful injury." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
11. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
12. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (requiring public
officials to prove actual malice to support their defamation actions).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law
Upon the establishment of the American colonies, the British settlers
created a legal system based on English common law principles.3 The
English common law defined libel as "[any] publication that 'robs a
good man of his good name, which ought to be more precious to him
than his life. '""4 Any publisher or disseminator accused of making a li-
belous statement was strictly liable if the alleged victim's "good name"
had been damaged-truth was no defense." Any publication criticizing
a government official was, by its very nature, considered criminally
libelous."
However, as the American colonies grew into a country, the apprecia-
tion for freedom of speech and freedom of the press developed. Truth
soon became an affirmative defense for one accused of libel." For the
first time, in 1735, a defendant in a libel case effectively used truth as a
13. CLIFTON 0. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL XV (1981) [hereinafter
LAWHORNE, LIBEL]; see also CLIFrON 0. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS
1-13 (1971) (hereinafter LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION].
14. LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at xv (quoting CASEDE LIBELLIS FAMOSIS, 5
COKE REPORTS 125A, 125B (1606)). English common law considered an individual's
"good name" and reputation to be of the utmost importance. Reputation determined
one's status in society, which determined one's self-esteem, ability to make social
contacts, and ability to make a living. A personal insult was something to die and
kdil over. See W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE 1-5 (1989); Michael D. Osteen, Note,
Fabricated Quotations-Facts or Falsehoods? Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 27
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 247, 247 (1990) (describing how in less civilized times injury to
reputation was often resolved by the barrel of a gun instead of a trial in a
courtroom).
15. HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 1. See also LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at xv;
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRS § 113, at 809-10
(5th ed. 1984) (stating that libel and slander were strict liability torts at common
law); Kay L Reamey, Note, TORTS-Defamation-Private Figure Plaintiff Must Show
Not Only Fault as to Falsity but also Falsity Itself to Recover Damages for Defama-
tory Statements Made by Media Defendants on Matters of Public Concern, 18 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 581, 584-86 (1986) (discussing the early development of common law
libel).
16. LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at xv-xvi. Judges, not juries, used to set the
punishment for one found guilty of libel. Often this punishment was as severe as
death. Id. at xvi.
17. HoPKIs, supra note 14, at 1. If the plaintiff could show that the published
statements were defamatory, falsity was presumed. Id.
defense.'
When the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the American press was
as free to criticize its government as any had been in history."9 The
young American government had attempted to use laws such as the
Sedition Law of 1798' to stifle journalistic criticism of government of-
ficials and activities. Despite these efforts, the American press,
throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was free
to publish statements regarding government officials, as long as the
statements were true.2'
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many state courts began
to accept the publisher's belief in the truth of his statement as a de-
fense to a public official's libel action.' Statements concerning a pub-
lic official's acts or conduct could not be considered libelous, even if
false, if the publisher believed, without malice, that the statements were
18. NORMAN L ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 35-40 (1986). The case in-
volved the publisher of the New-York Weekly Journal, John Peter Zenger, who pub-
lished criticisms of the New York governor, William Cosby. Although the jury found
that Zenger had published the criticisms, it found Zenger not guilty of libel because
the published statements were true, notwithstanding the judge's instructions that truth
could not be used as a defense. ld. at 35. Despite the fact that the British crown did
not consider this case binding, it nevertheless had precedential value in the American
colonies. Just six years later, the publisher of the Boston Evening Post, Thomas
Fleet, escaped a libel charge by producing five witnesses who testified that the criti-
cisms he had published about Robert Walpole, the British Prime Minister, were in
fact true. LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at xvi-xvii.
19. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION, supra note 13, at 39.
20. The Sedition Law of 1798 stated:
If any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous
and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States, or... Congress ... or the president .. . with intent to defame the
said government or either house of... Congress, or the said President, or
to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them . . .
the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition
within the United States ... then such person, being thereof convicted . . .
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by im-
prisonment not exceeding two years.
LAWHORNE, LIBEL supra note 13, at 2.
21. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION, supra note 13, at 82. In a majority of states at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, truth was a defense in a libel action. The stan-
dard for truth at this time was best set out in an 1807 Tennessee case in which the
court stated: "Let his talents, his virtues and such vices as are likely to affect his
public character be freely discussed, but no falsehoods be propagated." Id. (citing
Brewer v. Weekley, 5 Am. Dec. 656, 658 (Tenn. 1807)).
22. LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at 7. Twenty-five of the twenty-eight states at
that time had some type of privilege for those who published false comments con-
cerning public officials, where the publisher honestly believed that the statements
were true at the time of publication. See LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION, supra note 13, at
87-110.
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true at the time of publication.' Even though a majority of states at
the turn of the century had some privilege of this type, the exact nature
of the privilege differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.' In three
states, no privilege existed at all.'
In 1925, the Supreme Court made the First Amendment applicable to
the states, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' Initially, however, the Supreme Court did not provide First
Amendment protection to statements that were defamatory under state
law.' Therefore, throughout the first half of this century, no uniformity
existed among the states for determining when a publisher was privi-
leged in communicating untrue statements concerning the activities of a
public official.' It was not until 1964, in New York Times v.
Sullivan,' that the Supreme Court determined when this privilege ex-
isted and to whom it applied.
B. Creation of the Actual Malice Standard
In New York Times v. Sullivan,' the Supreme Court held for the
23. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION, supra note 13, at 108. Lack of malice could be shown
where the publisher had a good faith belief that the statements were true, and where
evidence showed that the publisher had "proper cause" for believing that the state-
ments were true. Id,
24. LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at 7-8. Some states allowed this privilege only
when the publication was one of comment and criticism, not when the publication
misstated fact. Other states allowed the privilege for statements addressing the public
official's activities but not for statements attacking the official's character or motives.
Id, at 7.
25. The three states were Tennessee, Missouri, and Indiana. LAWHORNE, DEFAMA-
TION, supra note 13, at 109.
26. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Justice Sanford wrote: "For
the present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Con-
gress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at
666.
27. See Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (stating that "libelous utter-
ances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech"); Beauharnais v. Il-
linois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (providing no First Amendment protection to libelous
statements which defamed groups of individuals); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (including libelous statements in list of certain types of speech
not deserving of First Amendment protection).
28. See LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at 15-25.
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
first time that the First Amendment could limit state defamation laws?
On March 29, 1960, The New York Times ran a full-page advertisement
entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices." The advertisement discussed the
civil rights movement in the South and called on individuals to assist
southern blacks in their struggle for equality.'
The Commissioner of Public Affairs for Montgomery Alabama, L.B.
Sullivan, who supervised the police and fire departments, claimed that
two paragraphs in the advertisement had defamed him.' Although the
advertisements never mentioned Sullivan by name, they did describe
how the Montgomery police allegedly harassed peaceful civil rights
demonstrators, including Dr. Martin Luther King.' Sullivan argued that
despite not being explicitly mentioned in the advertisements, he was
implicitly libeled because he had supervised police activities at the time
of the alleged harassment.TM An Alabama jury agreed with Sullivan and
awarded him the full amount of damages he had requested. 7 The Ala-
31. ld. at 264.
32. Id. at 256. The advertisement was written and signed by the Committee to
Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. Id at 257.
33. Id. at 256. The advertisement began by stating: "As the whole world knows by
now, thousands of [s]outhern Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent
demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaran-
teed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights." Id
34. Id.
35. Id. The advertisement contained ten paragraphs. Sullivan complained of the
third and a portion of the sixth paragraphs. The third paragraph stated:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on
the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truck-
loads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State
College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities
by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to
starve them into submission.
Id. at 257. The sixth paragraph stated:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful
protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home, almost
killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested
him seven times-for "speeding," "loitering," and similar "offenses." And now
they have charged him with "perjury"-a felony under which they could im-
prisoned him for ten years.
Id. at 257-58 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 258. Suit was actually brought against The New York Times and four
Alabama clergymen who endorsed the advertisement, Id at 256. The four clergymen
were Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy, Reverend S.S. Seay, Reverend Fred L.
Shuttlesworth, and Reverend J.E. Lowery. See HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 12.
37. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256. Alabama libel law did allow truth as a
defense in a libel action. Id. at 262. However, because it was an affirmative defense,
the defendant bore the burden of proof. Id. at 267. No privilege existed for a pub-
lisher who reasonably believed the statements were true; however, a reasonable belief
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bama Supreme Court affirmed the decision.'
A unanimous United States Supreme Court, however, reversed. The
writ of certiorari was the first in history for a state civil libel suit.'
The Supreme Court held that although Alabama libel law recognized
truth as an affirmative defense in a defamation cause of action, truth
alone did not provide sufficient First Amendment protection to critics
of public officials.' Because the Court viewed this case as one involv-
ing criticism of the government and not simply an individual, the Court
considered Alabama's libel law to be a threat to free, open, and robust
political debate." If a person who challenges a public official's conduct
must guarantee the accuracy and truth of every assertion made con-
cerning such conduct, self-censorship would increase and free debate
would decline.'
In New York Times v. Sullivan,' therefore, the Supreme Court did
more than reverse an Alabama libel decision. It articulated a formal rule
that required actual malice in order for people who comment on public
officials to be guilty of libel.'
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
in the truth of the statements could be used to mitigate punitive damages. Id, at 267.
Some of the statements printed in paragraphs three and six of the advertisement
were false: (i) students had been expelled for demanding lunch-counter service at the
Montgomery County Courthouse, not for demonstrating on the Capitol steps; (ii) only
a majority of the student body protested the expulsions; (iii) the police never pad-
locked the dining hall door, and (iv) Martin Luther King had been arrested only four
times, not seven. Id. at 258-59. These misstatements, together with Alabama's libel
law, resulted in a $500,000 judgment-at that time the largest judgment in Alabama's
history. See LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at 28.
38. 'New York Times, 376 U.S. at 263-64.
39. See LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at 28. The Alabama State Supreme Court
claimed that the U.S. Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the present
case because it was a private lawsuit and "[tlhe Fourteenth Amendment is directed
against State action not private action." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265. However,
the Supreme Court made it clear that because the Alabama courts used a state rule
of law to render a libel judgment, state action was involved. Id.
40. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278-79. The Court reasoned that the lesson taught
by the Sedition Act, that the defense of truth in a libel suit was insufficient to pro-
tect free debate and discussion, still held true. Id. at 276-77.
41. Id. at 279.
42. Id. The Court stated: "A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guar-
antee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments
virtually unlimited in amount-lends to comparable self censorship." Id.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44. Id at 279-80.
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual mal-
ice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.'
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court found that even though The
New York Times may have been negligent in not fully investigating the
validity of the advertisement's assertions, it did not recklessly or inten-
tionally publish false statements.4' Therefore, no actual malice was pres-
ent.47
C. To Whom Does the Actual Malice Standard Apply?
1. Public Figures/Public Interest
In its 1964 New York Times decision, the Supreme Court limited its
new actual malice "privilege" to statements about the bureaucratic con-
duct of public officials.' Soon after, however, the Supreme Court ex-
panded the list of plaintiffs who must prove actual malice." In 1966, the
45. Id. Three Justices, Arthur Goldberg, Hugo Black, and William 0. Douglas, con-
curred in the judgment, arguing that the rule should not be conditional. Id at
293-305 (Goldberg, Black, and Douglas, JJ., concurring). Goldberg and Black both
stressed the absolute right to question government. Id. at 293-305 (Goldberg and
Black, JJ., concurring).
46. Id. at 287-88. In making this conclusion, the Court made it clear that reckless
disregard of the truth requires proof that the publisher acted with a level of care
lower than negligence. See LAWHORNE, LIBEL supra note 13, at 32-33.
47. The Supreme Court could have decided New York Times v. Sullivan on other
grounds. For instance, the allegedly libelous statements concerning the Montgomery
police department were arguably not statements "of and concerning" the respondent.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288. The Court could have held that criticisms of
governmental operations are not to be considered criticisms of the individual or indi-
viduals responsible for those operations. Id. at 292.
For further discussion on New York Times, see generally HOPKINS, supra note
14, at 24-47 (examining both the questions and answers New York Times addressed);
ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 243-55 (describing the effect that New York Times had
on libel law).
48. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279. But the Court refused to define the term
"public official." The Court stated: "We have no occasion here to determine how far
down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation
would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons
who would or would not be included." Id. at 283 n.23.
49. See infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court also has
held that actual malice is required not only in civil actions involving public plaintiffs,
but also to impose criminal sanctions on the publisher. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964) (convicting New Orleans district attorney Jim Garrison of criminal libel
when he accused eight district court judges in New Orleans of being lazy, inefficient,
and taking long vacations). Cf. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 201 (1966) (holding
Kentucky's broad criminal libel statute unconstitutional).
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Supreme Court held that in defamation suits, public officials includes
governmental employees whom the public believes possess substantial
responsibility to effect and control governmental issues.' That same
year, the Court declared that individuals involved in union disputes are
also public officials for purposes of a defamation action. Therefore, these
plaintiffs must show knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard on the
part of the publisher before they can recover.5
A year later, in the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
and Associated Press v. Walker,n the Supreme Court extended the New
York Times actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth test still
further to include public figures. Butts was the athletic director at the
University of Georgia when he sued over an article accusing him of con-
spiring to rlix a college football game between the University of Georgia
and the University of Alabama.' Walker was a retired United States ar-
50. Rosenblatt v. Barr, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). Rosenblatt involved a newspaper col-
umn about a ski resort in New Hampshire. Three county commissioners had previous-
ly appointed Barr to supervise the resort. Id. at 78. The column suggested that Barr
had been embezzling money from the ski resort. Id. at 78-79. The Court held that
government employees who appear to the public to have substantial control over
governmental affairs and who are in a position to invite public scrutiny are deemed pub-
lic officials even though they have never been elected. Id at 86-89. The Court, how-
ever, remanded the case for a determination of whether Barr came within this defini-
tion. Id. at 87-88.
51. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 56
(1966). In Linn, the petitioner was a detective agency official who filed a defamation
suit against a union that claimed the petitioner had lied and robbed some of his
employees. Id. The Court held that during union organizing campaigns, those involved
in the union-employer negotiations would have to show either actual knowledge or
reckless disregard for truth when the statements concerned the negotiations. Id, at
65.
Also, in 1971, the Court expanded the meaning of the term "official conduct" as
it was used in New York Times to mean any conduct "which might touch on an
official's fitness for office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971).
52. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court brought the two cases together to decide
whether a public figure who is not a public official must prove actual malice in a
libel action. Id. at 134.
53. Id. at 135-37. Butts was particularly upset by an editor's note that followed the
article:
Not since the Chicago White Sox threw the 1919 World Series has there
been a sports story as shocking as this one .... Before the University of
Georgia played the University of Alabama . . . Wally Butts ... gave [the
Alabama coach] . . . Georgia's plays, defensive patterns, [all the significant
secrets of Georgia's football team.]
Id at 136.
my general when he sued a number of newspapers carrying an Associat-
ed Press article that claimed he took part in an anti-integration riot at the
University of Mississippi in 1962.'
The Supreme Court held that both Butts and Walker were public fig-
ures. ' The Court reasoned that both were in the public eye,' both
were in a position to affect public policy determinations,57 and both had
access to channels of information that enabled them to assert
counterarguments to the allegedly defamatory statements.' The Su-
preme Court stated that "'the guarantees of speech and press are not
exclusively the preserve of political expression; '" rather, the framers of
the Constitution intended free press to also advance "'truth, science, mo-
rality and the arts in general.' "' Therefore, people who are in a position
to influence public debate on issues of public interest, even though they
are not public officials, must show actual knowledge or reckless disre-
gard for the truth on the part of the publisher before they can recover
for defamation.' However, the Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing did
not precisely define the term "public figure." That definition was to come
54. Id, at 140-42. Actually, Walker had commanded army units which enforced
integration at Central High School in Little Rock Arkansas in 1957. See LAWHORNE,
LIBEL, supra note 13, at 51.
55. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 154-55. The public figure status was based on
Butts' "position alone" and Walker's "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of
his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." Id. at 155.
56. Id. at 154-55. The Court's rationale for extending the actual malice standard to
public figures was summarized in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion:
In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled
through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented
through a complex array of boards, committees, commissioners, corporations
and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. This
blending of position and power has also accrued in the case of individuals so
that many who-do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless in-
timately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by rea-
son of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. 1d at 155.
59. Id. at 147 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
60. Id- at 147 (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 154. Four Justices-Brennan, White, Black and Douglas--dissented. All
nine justices agreed with the majority that the "actual knowledge or reckless disre-
gard .for the truth" standard should also be applied to public figures. Id. However,
two dissenting justices questioned whether it was proper for the Court to reexamine
questions of fact that the jury had already determined. Id. at 170-71 (Black and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting). Two other justices disagreed with the majority over whether
there should be a new trial at which the actual malice standard would be applied.
Id. at 174 (Brennan and White, JJ., dissenting).
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seven years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'
2. Private Figures/Public Interest
In 1971, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the New York
Times actual malice standard should apply to private figure plaintiffs
when their activities are a matter of "public or general interest."' How-
ever, three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," a majority of the
Court held that the New York Times actual malice standard did not apply
to private figure plaintiffs in lawsuits involving issues of public inter-
est.M
Gertz was a locally well-known attorney who represented a family
whose son had been fatally shot by a Chicago policeman.' An article in
the respondent's magazine alleged that the policeman's murder trial was
62. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
63. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971). Rosenbloom involved a
distributor of nudist magazines who was arrested for selling obscene materials. Id, at
32. When the respondent reported the story on its newscast, it called the petitioner a
.smut merchant" and indirectly referred to the petitioner as a "girlie-book peddler."
Id. at 33-34. Eight justices took part in the decision, and each justice agreed that the
Court could not hold a media defendant strictly liable for publishing false statements
about a private figure which were of public or general interest. Id. at 64-65 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). There was strong disagreement, however, over what level of protection
the First Amendment gave the media in this type of situation. Justices Brennan and
Blackmun and Chief Justice Warren held that courts should apply the actual malice
standard in all defamation cases that deal with statements of public or general inter-
est, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure. Id. at 44. Justices
White and Black concurred separately, with Justice Black arguing that the First
Amendment allows no recovery against the media in a libel suit. I& at 57 (Black, J.,
concurring). Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented. Justice Harlan believed
that the actual malice standard should not apply in all defamation cases that involve
issues of public or general interest because everything the media reports could be
considered as such. I& at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id, at 79 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). From 1971 to 1974, six federal appellate courts and seventeen states
followed the plurality opinion. LAWHORNE, LIBEL, supra note 13, at 81.
The precedent for this plurality ruling came from the analogous false light inva-
sion of privacy action. In 1967, the Court had held that in a suit for false light, the
plaintiff, whether private or public, must show that the defendant published the
report with either "knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth" if
the report was one of "public interest." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-90 (1967).
64. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
65. Id, at 347.
66. I& at 325-27. The Chicago policeman, Richard Nuccio, had been convicted of
second degree murder for killing the boy. Id. at 325.
part of a communist conspiracy to discredit the police department, and
accused Gertz of being a "Communist-fronter." 7 Gertz filed suit,
claiming that the article had irjured his reputation.'
The Supreme Court held that Gertz was not a public figure and, there-
fore, was not constitutionally required to show actual malice.' The
Court reasoned that unlike public officials and public figures, private
plaintiffs do not have immediate access to information mediums and,
thus, are unable to rebut defamatory attacks.' In addition, they do not
voluntarily thrust themselves into the public eye."' As a result, the pub-
lisher does not warrant as high a level of constitutional protection as it
67. Id. at 325-26. The article's title was "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War
On Police." Id, at 326. Besides accusing Gertz of being a "Communist-fronter," the
article also stated that he had been an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial
Democracy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, which has advo-
cated the violent seizure of our government." Id.
68. Id. at 327.
69. Id. at 351-53. Despite the fact that Gertz had served as an officer of local civic
groups, had published several books and articles on legal subjects, and was well
known in some circles, the Court did not consider him a public figure. Id. at 351-52.
Furthermore, Gertz's former position on a housing committee did not qualify him as
a public official. Id.
70. Id. at 344. The Court stated:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help--using available op-
portunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize
its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually
enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
than private individuals normally enjoy.
Id.
71. Id. at 351. The Court reasoned that an individual can become a public figure
in one of two ways. First, some individuals achieve such pervasive fame and notori-
ety that they become public figures in all contexts and situations. Id, Second, and
"[m]ore commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself. . . into a ... public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Id.
Clearly, Gertz was not a public figure for all purposes. What name recognition
he did possess was limited. Id. at 351-52. The Court also held that Gertz was not a
public figure in the particular controversy which led to his defamation suit, since he
took no part in the prosecution of Officer Nuccio, never discussed the case with the
press, and only represented his private client. Id. at 352. Thus, Gertz did not "thrust
himself into the vortex of this public issue." Id.
Several post-Gertz decisions have further defined who may be a public figure.
See Woiston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 159 (1979) (holding that a
person subject to a twenty-one year investigation of Soviet intelligence activities was
not a public figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979) (holding that
a scientist who received an award for animal research was not a public figure);
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (holding that a wealthy socialite seeking
a divorce was not a public figure for all purposes, nor was she a public figure for
limited purposes).
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would for statements about a public plaintiff.'
Because the Constitution does not require actual malice in defamation
suits involving private figures and public issues,' the Court allowed the
states to set the standard at actual malice, or any lesser standard of fault
other than strict liability. ' While permitting recovery for private figure
plaintiffs under a lower standard than actual malice, the Gertz court also
limited that; recovery to actual damages.78 The Court held that a private
plaintiff could not recover punitive or presumed damages without proof
of actual malice.'
3. Private Figure/Private Concern
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders" addressed the First
Amendment limitations on a private figure's recovery for defamatory
statements that are not a matter of public concern. The defendant was a
credit reporting agency that falsely reported to a few subscribers that
Greenmoss Builders was insolvent.' Greenmoss Builders received a jury
verdict in its favor for $50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in
punitive damages.' The award for punitive damages seemed contrary to
Gertz because the defendant lacked actual malice.' However, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court upheld the damage award, finding that because the
defendant was non-media, the Gertz punitive damages rule was inapplica-
ble.8'
72. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-47.
73. Id. at 347.
74. Id. After Gertz, most states adopted a negligence standard for defamation suits
involving a private figure plaintiff and statements of public interest. See LAWHORNE,
LIBEL,. supra note 13, at 90. A few states adopted a gross negligence standard. Id.
Two states, Indiana and Colorado, retained the actual knowledge or reckless disre-
gard standard as in was applied in Rosenbloom. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun,
Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating and
Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct App.
1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
75. Id. at 349-50. Actual damages include monetary damages, damage to one's
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, as well as mental
anguish and suffering. Id, at 350.
76. Id at 349-50.
77. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
78. Id. at 751-53. Greenmoss Builders was never insolvent; it was one of its former
employees who had filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 752.
79. Id, at 752.
80. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
81. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 752-53. According to the Vermont Supreme
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, but not because Gertz did
not apply to non-media defendant cases.' Rather, because the credit
report contained no public issues, it was not a matter of public con-
cern.' The Court reasoned that such matters are not essential for ro-
bust and vigorous debate on public issues." A plurality of the Court
concluded that "[p]ermitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages
in defamation cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate
the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern."' In so ruling, the Court raised the possibili-
ty that a private figure, who sues over statements not of public concern,
may not even have to show ordinary negligence in order to recover.'
D. Defining Actual Malice
In New York Times, the Supreme Court defined actual malice as pub-
lishing a statement with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for
its truth.'? In Garrison v. Louisiana," the Court shed some light on the
ambiguous phrase "reckless disregard." The Court held that to show
reckless disregard, the defendant must have entertained a high degree of
awareness of the statement's falsity at the time it was published.' How-
ever, it was not until St. Amant v. Thompson'° that the Court took a
Court, a credit reporting agency, "which [was] in the business of selling financial
information to a limited number of subscribers," was not a media defendant and,
therefore, was not worthy of the same First Amendment protection given the defen-
dant in New York Times. Id. at 753.
82. Justice Powell's plurality opinion does not address the distinction between
media and non-media defendants in defamation suits. However, five members of the
Dun & Bradstreet Court specifically rejected the holding of the Vermont Supreme
Court that the Constitution protects media defendants more than non-media defen-
dants. See id. at 773 (White, J., concurring); id, at 781-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joining in Brennan's dissent); see also Sharon A.
Mattingly, Note, To Quote or Not to Quote: The Status of Misquoted Material in
Defamation Law, 43 VAND. L REV. 1637, 1645 (1990).
83. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-63. The Court reasoned that the credit
report was "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience." Id. at 762. Furthermore, the report was made available to only
five subscribers. Id.
84. Id. at 762.
85. Id. at 763.
86. See id, at 772-73 (White, J., concurring).
87. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
88. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
89. Id. at 74. See also Mattingly, supra note 82, at 1646. In 1967, the Court stated
that proof of intentional distortion or reckless publication "despite the publisher's
awareness of probable falsity was essential to recovery by a public official." Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967).
90. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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significant step in explaining how to apply the reckless disregard
standard.
In St. Amant, the petitioner was a political candidate who, during a
televised speech, read questions he had previously asked a third party
and the answers the third party had given." The answers falsely charged
the respondent with criminal conduct, and the respondent brought
suit.' The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's statements were not
defamatory because the petitioner did not make the statements with
reckless disregard for their validity. ' The Supreme Court stated:
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.'"
Thus, the Court applied a subjective standard and found that because the
petitioner did not, in fact, entertain serious doubts as to the truth of the
statements, he lacked actual malice.'
E. Truth and Opinion
1. Burden of Proof
The Supreme Court's application of the actual malice standard in New
York Times and Curtis Publishing placed the burden of proving falsity
on public plaintiffs.' In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,' the Court
91. Id. at 728-29.
92. Id. One answer in particular accused Thompson, a sheriffs deputy, of taking
money from the president of a Teamsters Union in his efforts to secret union re-
cords. Id. at 728, 729 n.1.
93. Id. at 732-33. Nor had petitioner made the statement knowing it was false. Id,
94. Id. at 731.
95. Id. at 732-33. In St. Amant, the Court did provide guidance to future triers of
fact as to -when reckless'disregard for truth has occurred:
Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example,
where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagina-
tion, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will
they be likely to prevail when the publisher's allegations are so inherently
improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation.
Likewise recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to
doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.
Id. at 732.
96. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v.
determined who carries the burden of proving falsity when the defama-
tion suit involves a private plaintiff and statements of public concern.
The Court reasoned that because true speech on matters of public con-
cern should not be deterred, the common law presumption that defama-
tory speech is false does not apply when a private plaintiff sues a media
defendant for statements concerning public issues.' Rather, the Consti-
tution requires that the private plaintiff bear the burden for both fault
and falsity.'
2. The Meaning of Falsity
For the defense of truth to constitute a barrier to recovery, the state-
ment in question need not be true in all aspects."n The statement need
only be substantially true.' Therefore, "[iut is not necessary to establish
the literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies of ex-
pression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in
substance. " "° The test for determining falsity is "whether the statement
produce[s] a different effect upon the reader than that which would be
produced by the literal truth of the matter."" Lower federal and state
courts have consistently followed this view."iu
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Mattingly, supra note 82, at 1648.
97. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Hepps involved a series of newspaper articles linking
Hepps, the principal stockholder of a corporation that franchised Thrifty stores, to or-
ganized crime. Id. at 769. The Pennsylvania courts required the private plaintiff to
prove negligence or malice, but followed the common law view that a defamatory
statement is presumed false unless the defendant shows otherwise. Id. at 770.
98. Id. at 776.
99. Id,
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. f (1977); W. PAGE KEETON,
ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 842 (5th ed. 1984).
101. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 116, at 842 (5th ed. 1984).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. f (1977).
103. Jonathon I. Lessner, Comment, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: Sex,
Woman, Fun, and Altered Quotations, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 159, 164 (1990) (quoting
Gomba v. McLaughlin, 504 P.2d 337, 338 (Colo. 1972) (citing Wehling v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 721 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1983); Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-American Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982); Bair v. Palm Beach News-
papers, Inc., 387 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
104. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 616
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Bell v. Courier-Journal and Louis-
ville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966); Ross v. Columbia Newspapers, Inc., 221
S.E.2d 770 (S.C. 1976).
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3. Special Treatment for Opinion
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., e the Supreme Court held that
some statements of opinion receive no special protection from the First
Amendment,"M reasoning that only false statements of fact are action-
able as defamation. 7 Therefore, before a plaintiff can recover for dam-
age to her reputation from a false opinion, she must show not only that
the opinion was false but that it stated or implied actual facts about
her." The rationale was that this rule would ensure "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open" debate on public issues and provide room for lack
of "imaginative expression.""M
F. Procedural Issues
1. Scope of Discovery
New York Times and subsequent cases placed the heavy burden of
showing culpability on the part of defendant publishers in defamation
suits on both public and private plaintiffs."' In 1979, the Court held in
Herbert v. Lando". that discovery rules would assist, not hinder, the
plaintiff in meeting this burden."' The case arose when former Army
Colonel Anthony Herbert, who had gained national recognition in Viet-
nam by accusing his commanding officer of war crimes, claimed that a
60 Minutes broadcast portrayed him as a liar by questioning the validity
105. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). Milkovich, a former high school wrestling coach, sued
the newspaper for defamation after one of its reporters accused him of lying under
oath about an incident at a wrestling match. Id at 2697-99. The trial, appellate, and
supreme courts in Ohio all held that the accusation constituted opinion and, there-
fore, could not form the basis of a defamation suit. Id. at 2699-701. The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the
allegedly defamatory statements contained factual assertions. Id. at 2707.
106. Id. at 2706.
107. Id. 2704-05.
108. Id. at 2704-07.
109. Id. at 2706; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment does provide protection for statements that cannot
"reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts"); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n
v. Bresler, .398 U.S. 6 (1970) (recognizing constitutional limitations on the type of
speech that may be subject to state defamation laws).
110. See supra notes 43-95 and accompanying text.
111. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
112. Id. at 169-70.
of Herbert's allegations."' In his attempt to prove that the defendants
broadcasted the program with knowledge of its falsity, Herbert ques-
tioned Lando, the producer and editor of the show, in pretrial deposi-
tions about his state of mind while preparing the program."' Lando re-
fused to answer, claiming that revealing such information would hinder
the editorial process and have a chilling effect on news reporting."'
The Supreme Court concluded, in a six-to-three opinion written by
Justice White, that because New York Times and its progeny requires the
plaintiff to prove the publisher's state of mind at the time of publication,
the plaintiff must be able to focus on the editorial process."' Therefore,
discovery devices, should provide access to this process so that the
plaintiff can obtain evidence of the publisher's level of culpability."7
2. Summary Judgments
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment
is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact."' In
1979, the Court stated that because proving actual malice requires expos-
ing the defendant's state of mind, it is generally not appropriate to grant
summary judgment in defamation suits."' In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., n however, the Court held that a public plaintiff must show by
113. Id. at 155-157. The 60 Minutes program that Herbert complained of was broad-
cast on CBS and entitled "The Selling of Colonel Herbert." Id.
114. Id. at 157.
115. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir. 1977).
116. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160. The Court stated:
New York Times and its progeny made it essential to proving liability that
the plaintiffs focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. To be
liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of public figures must know
or have reason to suspect that his publication is false. In other cases proof
of some kind of fault, negligence perhaps, is essential to recovery. Inevitably,
unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial pro-
cess of the alleged defamer would be open to examination.
Id. at 176.
117. Id. at 175-76.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Mattingly, supra note 82, at 1648.
119. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979); see also Mattingly, supra
note 82, at 1648.
120. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). This case arose when Investigator Magazine published
two articles that portrayed respondent Willis Carto, the founder and treasurer of
Liberty Lobby, Inc., as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and fascist. Id. at 24445. Fol-
lowing discovery, Liberty Lobby moved for summary judgment, claiming that there
was no evidence of actual malice because they had carefully researched the articles.
Id. at 245. The district court agreed. Id. at 246. The court of appeal reversed, holding
that Carto did not have to prove the possibility of actual malice by clear and con-
vincing evidence at the summary judgment stage and that, therefore, the case should
go to trial. Id. at 246-47. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 257.
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clear and convincing evidence that a genuine issue of actual malice ex-
ists to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 2 ' By so ruling, the Court
increased the media defendant's chances of success at the summary judg-
ment stage of the proceedings."
Ill. MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.
A. Factual Background
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson was a noted psychoanalyst and former pro-
fessor of Indian Studies and Sanskrit at the University of Toronto."n In
1980, Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna Freud hired Masson as projects di-
rector of the Sigmund Freud Archives, located near London at Maresfield
Gardens.u By 1981, Masson had become disillusioned with Freudian
psychology and, during his lecture before the Western New England Psy-
choanalytical Society in New Haven, Connecticut, criticized Sigmund
Freud for abandoning his seduction theory simply to advance his own ca-
reer."n Shortly thereafter, Masson was fired from his position as pro-
jects director of the Freud Archives.'"
The following year, Janet Malcolm, a writer for The New Yorker maga-
zine, interviewed Masson for an article on Masson's relationship with the
Archives."' The New Yorker published Malcolm's article, entitled An-
nals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives, as a two-part series in De-
cember 1983." On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action
for defamation and false light in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.' Named as defendants in the complaint
121. Id. at 255-56.
122. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court, but included some
confusing recommendations. The Court suggested that the'trial judge examine the
quantity and quality of the evidence to determine if it meets the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard, without weighing the evidence or determining its credibility. Id.
at 254-55.
123. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991).
124. Id, :Dr. Eissler was head of the Sigmund Freud Archives. Anna Freud, the
daughter of Sigmund Freud, was a noted psychoanalyst. Id
125. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989). The
seduction theory, one of Sigmund Freud's psychological hypotheses, maintained that
childhood sexual abuse was the cause of certain types of mental illness. Id.
126. Ma&non, 111 S. Ct. at 2424.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2424-25.
129. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453. Masson admitted his public figure status at the
were Malcolm, The New Yorker, and Alfred A. Knopf Inc., who had pub-
lished Malcolm's entire article as a book entitled In the Freud Ar-
chives.10
Masson claimed that Malcolm had intentionally misquoted
him 3 -that she had placed quotation marks around several passages in
the article which contained words and phrases that he had never even
uttered-words that portrayed him as a "mean-spirited, self-serving,...
arrogant, self-destructive, fool.""3 .
Of the twelve passages that Masson claimed were libelous, the district
court found four to be substantially true and, therefore, issued a partial
summary judgment for the defendants." As for the remaining eight pas-
sages, the court held that they were either substantially true or were
"'one of a number of possible rational interpretations' of a conversation
or event that 'bristled with ambiguities. '"" In August 1987, the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating that "[n]o
clear and convincing evidence exists that would justify a finding that the
writer or the publishers entertained serious doubts about the truth of the
disputed passages. " "s
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed." The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that despite the fact that Malcolm deliberately altered quota-
tions, these passages could not be considered defamatory because there
was no showing of actual malice. 3" The court of appeals agreed with
the district court that as long as the statements contained within quo-
tation marks are a "rational interpretation" of the words actually spoken,
the misquotation does not amount to actual malice. 3l
beginning of the proceedings. Id.
130. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425. Alfred A. Knopf 'published the book in 1984 even
though he was aware of Masson's accusations that sections of the work were defam-
atory. Id.
131. Id. Masson had expressed concern during the editorial process that some of
the passages in the article were inaccurate. Nancy Franklin, a fact-checker with The
New Yorker, called Masson to confirm some of the facts in the article. Despite
Masson's complaint of factual errors, and his request to review those passages in
quotations, Franklin and The New Yorker's only response was a promise to get back
to him. Id. at 2424-25.
132. Id. at 2425. See infra notes 171-93 for a comparison of Masson's actual words
and Malcolm's quotations.
133. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal.
1987). The four passages found to be true were not discussed further in the district
court's opinion and, therefore, were not addressed on appeal.
134. Id. at 1399.
135. Id. at 1407.
136. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
137. Id. at 1464.
138. Id. at 1456. The court of appeals drew its rational interpretation standard
primarily from two U.S. Supreme Court cases. The first was Time, Inc. v Pape, 401
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The lone dissenter, Judge Alex Kozinski, argued that intentional or
reckless alteration of quotations should satisfy the actual malice require-
ment if the statements contained in quotation marks are defamatory,
contain material inaccuracies, and purport to be a verbatim rendition of
what was actually said.'-
B. The Court's Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the district and appellate court decisions
and, in so doing, rejected the rational interpretation test, replacing it with
a test of their own.'4° According to the majority, evidence that the au-
thor placed quotation marks around words that the plaintiff did not actu-
ally speak is insufficient to prove actual malice. 4' The speaker must al-
so prove that the alteration resulted in a "material change in the mean-
U.S. 279 (1971). In Pape, a government report, which was designed to examine police
brutality, disclosed alleged violations by the Chicago police of the Federal Civil
Rights Acts. Id, at 280-83. In summarizing that section of the report, .Time magazine
failed to mention that the report only alleged police brutality and that it had not yet
been proven. Id, at 282-83. Pape, a Chicago police officer, sued Time for libel. Id,
The Court concluded that because the report was filled with ambiguities, no jury
could find that Time acted with actual malice. Id. at 289-90. According to Pape, a
plaintiff cannot establish actual malice where the allegedly defamatory article is a
"rational interpretation" of an ambiguous document. Id, at 290.
The second case was Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Bose
centered on an article that described the sound from the plaintiffs sound system as
tending "to wander 'about the room.'" Id. at 494. Bose brought suit for product
disparagement. Id. at 488. The. Court held that the writer's choice of words did not
constitute actual malice because they were a "rational interpretation" of an ambiguous
event: the movement of sound. Id. at 512-13.
139. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1479-82 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski set forth
a five-step inquiry for determining whether a showing of fabricated quotations is suffi-
cient to avoid summary' judgment on the question of actual malice. First, the plaintiff
must show that the quotation purports to be a verbatim rendition of what the
speaker actually said. Id. at 1479-80 (Kozinski; J., dissenting). Second, the court must
determine if the quote is inaccurate. Id. at 1480 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Third, the
court must determine if the inaccuracies are material. Id. at 1480-81 (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting). Fourth, the court must then decide if the material inaccuracies are defama-
tory. Id. at 1481-82 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Finally, the court must determine wheth-
er there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the misquotations resulted
from actual malice. Id. at 1482.
140. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991).
141. Id
ing,"142
Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion by recognizing that libel,
under California law, is "'a false and unprivileged publication by writ-
ing... which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or oblo-
quy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a ten-
dency to injure him in his occupation.'"" The Court noted, however,
that the First Amendment limits the application of all state libel laws"
The Court's analysis then turned to the literary instrument around
which the case centered: the quotation mark.' 6 The purpose of quota-
tions in a literary work is to "add authority to the statement and credibil-
ity to the author's work," thus allowing "the reader to form his or her
own conclusions, and to assess the conclusions of the author, instead of
relying entirely upon the author's characterization of her subject."' The
majority identified two ways in which a fabricated quotation could harm
a reputation.' 7 First, a quotation can injure a reputation when "it attrib-
utes an untrue factual assertion to the speaker." Second, "regardless
of the truth or falsity of the factual matters asserted within the quoted
statement, the attribution may result in injury to reputation because the
manner of expression or even the fact that the statement was made indi-
cates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not
hold." 9 Although the Court identified situations where quotation marks
might not represent a verbatim reproduction of the speaker's exact
words, it found that the present case did not fall within any of these
categories."
Next, the Court determined what type of quotation alteration would
142. Ld.
143. Id. at 2429 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982)). For a further explana-
tion of libel law under section 45 of the California Civil Code, see Baker v. Los
Angeles Herald Examiner, 721 P.2d 87, 90-91 (Cal. 1986); Selleck v. Globe Internation-
al, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Cameron v. Wernick, 60 Cal. Rptr.
102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 581 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1942).
144. Ma.sson, 111 S. Ct. at 2429-30. See also supra notes 26-31 and accompanying
text.
145. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2430-31.
146. Id. at 2430.
147. Id
148. Id, An example would be a fabricated quotation of a public official admitting
that he had been convicted of a crime. Id.
149. Id. A real-life example is Time quoting John Lennon as saying of the Beatles,
"[W]e're more popular than Jesus Christ now." Id, (quoting TIME, Aug. 12, 1966, at
38). Regardless of the truth of Lennon's statement, the fact that he made the remark
potentially damaged his reputation. Id.
150. Id. at 2430-31. For instance, the conversation reported in quotation marks may
be hypothetical, or the work may be a docudrama or historical fiction. Id.
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constitute actual malice and falsity for purp6ses of a summary judgment
motion."' The majority rejected Masson's assertion that any alteration
of a quotation aside from grammatical or syntactic corrections is disposi-
tive in showing the elements of actual malice and falsity." A journalist
will often take pages of notes in an interview and, out of necessity, at-
tribute words to a speaker other than those actually uttered." The
court reasoned that it would be unreasonable to believe that any change
beyond grammatical and syntactic corrections would equal actual malice
due to the following. factors: "the existence of both a speaker and a re-
porter, the translation between two media, speech and the printed word;
the addition of punctuation; and the practical necessity to edit and make
intelligible a speaker's perhaps rambling comments.""
The Court also reasoned that throughout the historical development of
libel law, statements have been considered false only if they were sub-
stantially false." Minor inaccuracies in communications, no matter
what the form, were not considered false, and hence, not defamatory."
"[A] statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a different
effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would
have produced.'" 7 A quoted statement that is slightly different from
what the speaker said, but has not materially changed the meaning of
what the speaker did in fact say, is not truly false; therefore, the alter-
ation cannot be determinative in showing actual malice."
In addition, the Court stressed that the historical basis of a defamation
cause of action was compensation for injury to one's reputation."
However, "[i]f an author alters a speaker's words but effects no material
change in meaning, including any meaning conveyed by the manner of
151. Id. at 2431.
152. Id. Masson argued that anything more than grammatical and syntactical correc-
tions within a quotation would do nothing to promote "open and robust debate." Id.
153. Id, at 2432.
154. Id,
155. Id. at 1232-33. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
156. Masson, Ill S. Ct. at 2432-33.
157. Id. (quoting ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 138
(1980)).
158. Id at 2432-33. Although courts have traditionally recognized falsity and actual
malice as separate elements in the tort of defamation, falsity must be proven before
actual malice can be shown. Therefore, if the published statement is not substantially
false, the publisher cannot be guilty of'actual malice. See Jonathan I. Lessner, Com-
ment, Mas;on v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: "Sex, Women, Fun, and Altered Quota-
tions," 45 U. MIAmi L REv. 159, 163-65 (1990).
159. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
fact of expression, the speaker suffers no injury to reputation that is
compensable as a defamation.""® Therefore, because altered quotations
that convey virtually the same meaning as the speaker's actual words are
not truly false, the Court concluded "that a deliberate alteration of the
words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with [actual malice] unless
the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by
the statement."6 '
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's rational interpretation test,"
reasoning that although the First Amendment allows authors to "rational-
ly interpret" an ambiguous source, that test does not apply when quota-
tions are being reconstructed." To allow journalists to place their own
rational interpretation of someone else's words inside quotation marks
would have the effect of "eliminating any method of distinguishing be-
tween the statements of the subject and the interpretation of the au-
thor .... [Such a standard] would diminish to a great degree the trust-
worthiness of the printed word, and eliminate the real meaning of quo-
tations.""'
In examining the six quoted passages in question, the Court first ap-
plied its new test for determining actual malice.' The Court found suf-
ficient evidence to create a jury question as to "whether Malcolm pub-
lished the statements with knowledge or reckless disregard of the alter-
ations."" The Court based its conclusion on the fact that Malcolm did
not have a working deadline,67 her conversations with Masson were
taped (not written)," and Malcolm's assertion that the misquoted mate-
rial in the article was not taped was inconsistent with the available evi-
dence.
The Court then examined whether or not the published statements
differed "materially in meaning from the tape recorded statements so as
160. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432. The Court reasoned that in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), this fundamental principle of defamation law applied
to communication labeled "opinion" and that, therefore, no exception should be made
for altered quotations. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432.
161. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433.
162. Id. at 2433-34.
163. Id. at 2434. The Court found that Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971), and
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), had no precedential effect on
the present case. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2434.
164. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2434.
165. Id. at 2435-37.
166. Id. at 2435.
167. Id. Malcolm was not working for a newspaper, and her story of Masson was
not considered "hot news." Id,
168. Id,
169. Id. Malcolm had told her editor-in-chief that the quotations of Masson had
come from her tape recorded interviews. Id.
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to create an issue of fact for a jury as to falsity.""T Following are the
six quoted passages, Masson's actual words, and the Court's falsity analy-
sis.
a. "Sex, women, and fun."
Malcolm quoted Masson's plans for occupying Maresfield Gardens after
Freud's death:
It was a beautiful house, but it was dark and sombre and dead. Nothing ever went
on there. I was the only person who ever came. I would have renovated it, opened
it up, brought it to life. Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholar-
ship, but it also would have been a place of sex, women, fun. It would have been
like the change in the Wizard of Oz, from black-and-white into color."'
In reality, Masson had told Malcolm that "it [Maresfield Gardens] is an
incredible storehouse. I mean, the library, Freud's library alone is price-
less in terms of what it contains: all his books with his annotations in
them; the Schreber case annotated, that kind of thing. It's fascinat-
ing."72 Earlier in the interview, Masson did mention his discussions
with a London analyst:
I like him. So, and we got on very well. That was the first time we ever met and
you know, it was buddy-buddy, and we were to stay with each other and [laughs]
we were going to pass women on to each other, and we were going to have a
great time together when I lived in the Freuds' house. We'd have great parties
there and we were [laughs) ... going to really, we were going to live it up.'"
The Court found that it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that
Masson's remarks bore the same substantive meaning as the statements
that Malcolm quoted. 4
b. "It sounded better."
Masson described to Malcolm why his grandfather had replaced the
family name, Moussaieff, with Masson, and why he chose to adopt
Moussaieff as his middle name. The article stated:
My father is a gem merchant who doesn't like to stay in any one place too long.
His father was a gem merchant, too-a Bessarabian gem merchant, named
Moussaieff, who went to Paris in the twenties and adopted the name Masson. My
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2426.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2436.
parents named me Jeffrey Lloyd Masson, but in 1975 1 decided to change my mid-
dle name to Moussaieff-it sounded better.'"
Masson had actually told Malcolm that his grandfather had changed
the family name "to hide his Jewishness."' 6 He told her that he wanted
to change his last name to Moussaieff because he "just liked it," but that
his wife objected and as a compromise he adopted his family's original
name as his middle name.' "
The Court held that any difference between "it sounded better" and "[I]
just liked it" was immaterial and did not materially change the meaning
of Masson's actual words."
c. 1 don't know why I put it in."
Masson described why he had previously criticized Freud for the al-
leged "sterility of psychoanalysis." Malcolm quoted Masson as saying:
"That remark about the sterility of psychoanalysis was something I
tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratuitous. I don't know
why I put it in.""
In fact, Masson said that "the last sentence was [a] possibly gratuitous-
ly offensive way to end a paper to a group of analysts," but that he did
"not know why psychoanalysis is sterile today.""
The Court held that there were material differences here and that,
therefore, Masson did have a cause of action as to this quoted pas-
sage. 8'
d. "Greatest analyst who ever lived."
Malcolm quoted Masson as predicting that after the release of his
book, the other members of his profession will say that "after Freud, he's
the greatest analyst who ever lived.""
Masson actually stated: "[F]or better or for worse, analysis stands or
falls with me now; it's me and Freud against the rest of the analytic
world .... Not so, it's me. It's me alone."" Later, Masson stated: "[I]
could single-handedly bring down the business [of Freudian psycholo-
175. AL
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id,
179. Id at 2426.
180. Id,
181. Id, at 2436.
182. Id. at 2427.
183. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1459 (9th Cir. 1989).
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gy."
84
The Court held that there was a material difference in meaning from
what was quoted and what was actually said."
e. "He had the wyrong man."
Malcolm quoted Masson as giving the following explanation of Eissler's
attempt to obtain a promise of confidentiality at the Archives board
meeting where Masson's employment was terminated:
[Eissler] was always putting moral pressure on me. "Do you want to poison Anna
Freud's last days? Have you no heart? You're going to kill the poor old woman." I
said to him, "What have I done? You're doing it. You're firing me. What am I sup-
posed to do-be grateful to you?" "You could be silent about it. You could swal-
low it. I know it is painful to you. But you could just live with it in silence." "Why
should I do that?" "Because it is the honorable thing to do." Well, he had the
wrong man.'"
Malcolm, however, had deleted part of Masson's explanation. Masson
argued that this caused the "wrong man" sentence to be used out of con-
text."7 Malcolm had left out the following:
You know, why should one do that? "Because it's the honorable thing to do and
you will save face. And who knows? If you never speak about it and you quietly
and humbly accept your judgment, who knows that in a few years if we don't
bring you back?" Well, he had the wrong man.
The Court held that leaving out this portion of Masson's explanation
did not materially misrepresent Masson's account of what happened."
f "Intellectual gigolo."
Malcolm's article quoted Masson's description of his relationship with
Anna Freud and Eissler as follows:
Then I met a rather attractive older graduate student and I had an affair with her.
One day, she took me to some art event, and she was sorry afterward. She said,
"Well, it is very nice sleeping with you in your room, but you're the kind of person
who should never leave the room-you're just a social embarrassment anywhere
else, though you're fine in your own room." And you know, in their way, if not in
so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me
184. I.
185. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2437.
186. Id. at 2428.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2437.
well enough "in my own room." They loved to hear from me what creeps and
dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo-you get your pleasure from
him, but you don't take him out in public."k
The following is what Masson actually told Malcolm during a tape
recorded interview:
They felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liability .... They liked me
when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the
truth about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense, much too ju-
nior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts to be
caught dead with me.''
The tape recordings did contain references to his graduate student
friend; however, there was no evidence that Masson or his superiors ever
referred to, or considered, Masson an "intellectual gigolo."" The Court
held that quoting Masson as saying that his superiors treated him like an
"intellectual gigolo" when in fact he had never used that term, presented
a jury question as to whether the passage materially changed the mean-
ing of what Masson actually said."
Having found that five of the six passages presented an issue of falsi-
ty,'" the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further
proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.'"
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice White, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in part and concurred
in part.'" The dissent contended that Malcolm and the other defendants
were not entitled to summary judgment on any of the six quotations
under examination.97 The dissent reasoned that the focus in the present
case was not whether the alterations were defamatory or substantially
true, but whether they were "knowingly or recklessly" altered." It was
the dissent's view that any deliberate rewording of a quotation necessari-
ly involves actual malice because the author is reporting a known falsi-
ty-the false'attribution of spoken words.'" Such rewording might not
have any defamatory effect or might be substantially true; however,
190. Id, at 2425.
191. Id. at 2426.
192. Id. at 2425-26.
193. Id. at 2435-36.
194. Id. at 2435-37.
195. Id. at 2437.
196. Id
197. Id, at 2437-39 (White, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2437-38 (White, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White disagreed with the majority's expansive
view of falsity, stating that "the falsehood, apparently, must be substantial; the report-
er may lie a little, but not too much." Id. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting).
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when an author knowingly attributes false words to a speaker, summary
judgment should not be based on lack of malice.' ° Moreover, simply
because an interviewer took poor notes during an interview is no reason
to give her license to reconstruct the speaker's words inside quotation
marks." Justice White believed that if a journalist is unsure of what a
speaker actually said, she should not have the right to falsely attribute
words to the speaker.' In such a situation, the journalist should para-
phrase.'
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
In June 1991, when the Supreme Court decided Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., the Court could have established at least three plausible
standards for fabricated quotations in a defamation suit. The first was
the rational interpretation standard which the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit set forth.' The second was the standard posited by the
petitioner and Justice White's dissent in Masson, which provided that any
deliberate alteration of a direct quotation beyond grammatical and word
choice corrections is a per se showing of actual malice.' The third
standard, which the Court did adopt, was that any deliberate or reckless
alteration of a quotation which "materially changes the meaning" of the
speaker's particular words constitutes actual malice.' Although argu-
ments supported each of the three standards, only the one chosen by the
200. Id. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that the majority's standard for
judging -whether false quotations were libelous does not properly separate the distinct
elements of a libel cause of action, the result being that the court decides issues that
should have been left to the jury. Justice White stated:
For a court to ask whether a misquotation substantially alters the meaning of
spoken words in a defamatory manner is a far different inquiry than whether
reasonable jurors could find that the misquotation was different enough to be
libelous. In the one case, the court is measuring the difference from its own
point of view;, in the other it is asking how the jury would or could view the
erroneous attribution.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2438-39. (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White, when the
interviewer tape records the interview, there is no basis for the majority's reasoning
that misquotations are at times unavoidable. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
202. Id, (White, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
204. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 140-61 and accompanying text.
Supreme Court was truly consistent with the common law of libel, fur-
thered the interests of New York Times v. Sullivan,7 and promoted
journalistic credibility.
A. Rejection of the Rational Interpretation Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "[m]alice will not
be inferred from evidence showing that the quoted language does not
contain the exact words used by the plaintiff provided that the fabricated
quotations are... 'rational interpretations' of ambiguous remarks made
by the public figure."" The problem this standard creates is obvious: it
allows journalists to fabricate quotations by interpreting what a public
figure has said and then attributing that interpretation to the public fig-
ure.m The words appearing on the printed page inside the quotation
marks are not the speaker's words or even his ideas, but are instead the
statements of the story writer that express a rational interpretation of
the speaker's communication."' "If the speaker is thereby made to
sound stupid or arrogant, evil or insincere, [this standard] denies him a
remedy.""' For example, the Ninth Circuit held that Malcolm's quoting
Masson as saying that he, after Sigmund Freud, "was the greatest analyst
who ever lived," did not necessarily prove actual malice because, even
though Masson never made that statement in particular, the quote was a
rational interpretation of Masson's many boastful statements during the
interview."' One such statement was, "[Ilt's me and Freud against the
rest of the analytical world .... Not so, it's me. It's me alone.""3 How-
ever, immediately before this quote Masson made it clear that he was not
professing to be a superior psychoanalyst; rather, he was referring to his
position on many psychological issues that differed from most other ana-
lysts, including Sigmund Freud.""
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion accurately describes the potential
harm from application of the rational interpretation test. "By eliminating
207. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
208. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The
second half of the Ninth Circuit standard was, "or do not 'alter the substantive
content' of unambiguous remarks actually made by the public figure." Id.
209. Id. at 1464 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
210. Id (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1459 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1467 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Masson's exact words were, "Talk to enough
analysts and get them right down to those concrete issues and you watch how differ-
ent it is from my position. It's utterly the opposite and that's finally what I realized,
that I hold a. position that no other analyst holds, including, alas, Freud." Id
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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any method of distinguishing between the statements of the subject and
the interpretation of the author, we would diminish to a great degree the
trustworthiness of the printed word, and eliminate the real meaning of
quotations.""' Upholding this standard would have undermined and
threatened the outcome the New York Times Court hoped to promote by
adopting the actual malice standard: "uninhibited, robust, and wide open
debate" on public issues." " Because "[n]ewsworthy figures might be-
come more wary of journalists, knowing that any comment could be
transmuted and attributed to the subject, so long as some bounds of
rational interpretation were not exceeded," many issues of public con-
cern would not get proper media coverage, thereby limiting the public's
access to needed information."7 Clearly, if the public knew that the
statements inside quotation marks were not the speaker's own words or
ideas, but the media's rational interpretation of them, the public's confi-
dence in the media as a fact-gathering and news-reporting institution
would erode.2 8
Not only is the rational interpretation standard inconsistent with the
goals of New York Times and its progeny, but it also runs contrary to the
general principles of libel law."9 The basic premise of a libel cause of
action, both at common law and at present, is that a person whose repu-
tation has been damaged by substantially false assertions of fact deserves
a remedy. The New York Times standard set constitutional limits on
such recovery." The rational interpretation standard, however, ignores
these limitations. It also ignores the libel elements of substantial falsity
and defamatory effect. Clearly, Malcolm's assertions that Masson said he
was the "greatest analyst who ever lived" and that his superiors treated
him like an "intellectual gigolo" damaged his reputation among his pro-
fessional peers and the general public by making him look conceited and
tactless.' Furthermore, because quotations purport to reflect the
215. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (1991).
216. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
217. ld. at 2434.
218. See iqfra notes 273-85 and accompanying text.
219. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432.
220. Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). See also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 30-122 and accompanying text.
222. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2435-37. Robert Coles, a psychiatrist and a Harvard
University professor, offered the following appraisal of Masson, based on Malcolm's
article:
Masson the promising psychoanalytic scholar emerges gradually, as a grandi-
speaker's words verbatim, or very close to it,' Malcolm's assertion that
Masson uttered the statements within the quotations was substantially
false.' Malcolm not only altered the meaning of Masson's real words,
but also the meaning conveyed by his manner of expression. The fact
that the Ninth Circuit found no actual malice in applying the rational
interpretation standard is a perfect example of that standard's deficien-
cies.'
Further evidence that the rational interpretation standard is unaccept-
able is that it falls to recognize professional journalistic standards for
quotations. Although a deviation from professional journalistic standards
is not dispositive in proving actual malice through "known falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth," such deviation can be considered.27
The majority of journalists recognize that "'[q]uotation marks mean liter-
ally that the words they enclose are exactly as the source gave
them-verbatim. ' fs Furthermore, "[m]ost of the newspaper codes or
canons tend to stress literal accuracy when quoting news sources. " ' In
ose egotist-mean-spirited, self-serving, full of braggadocio, impossibly arro-
gant and, in the end, a self-destructive fool. But it is not Janet Malcolm who
calls him suck- his own words reveal this psychological profile-a self-portrait
offered to us through the efforts of an observer and listener who is, surely,
as wise as any in the psychoanalytic profession.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1465 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinskl, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Coles, Freudianism and Its Malcontents, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27,
1984, at 58, 60).
223. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2430-31. Quotation marks around a passage are not
always intended to indicate that the passage reproduces the speaker's words verba-
tim. Id. at 2430. If quotations are used in a docudrama or a piece of historical
fiction, then they are generally not intended to be "the actual statements of the
speaker to whom they are attributed." Id. However, Malcolm's article did not indicate
that the quotations were used for anything but actual reproductions of Masson's
exact statements. Id.
224. Id. at 2435-37.
225. Id. For example, not only did Masson never state in substance that he was
"the greatest analyst who ever lived," but also the tone of such a statement makes
Masson sound "arrogant and unprofessional." Id. at 2437.
226. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456-59.
227. Harte-Hanks Comm. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989). In Harte-Hanks,
the respondent was an unsuccessful challenger for a municipal judge position in
Hamilton, Ohio. He sued a local newspaper after it ran a story during the election
which stated that he had used "dirty tricks" and had offered members of a grand
jury a trip to Florida in appreciation for their role in indicting his opponent's Direc-
tor of Court Services for bribery. Id. at 2692. The Court held that the fact that the
newspaper's story was "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme depar-
ture from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by rea-
sonable publishers," does not in itself constitute a "known falsity or reckless disre-
gard for the truth." Id. at 2685.
228. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1474. (Kozinskl, J., dissenting) (quoting M.V. CHARNLEY &
B. CHARNLEY, REPORTING 248 (4th ed. 1979)).
229. JOHN L HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE NEWS
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fact, William Shawn, editor-in-chief of The New Yorker at the time
Malcolm's article was published, stated that "[t]he New Yorker 'ideal is a
verbatim quote." °
Reporters have recognized, however, that unless they have at their
disposal a trial transcript, a tape recording, or a prepared manuscript, it
is very difficult to reproduce exactly what a speaker said." And most
journalists recognize the need to "clean up quotes" by correcting gram-
mar and word usage mistakes.' Many journalists, but certainly not all,
believe that a reporter should be allowed to alter a quotation by reword-
ing the speaker's assertions in order to fit the journalist's needs.' How-
ever, the authorities uniformly agree that an altered quotation must truth-
fully portray the speaker's message, keeping the meaning of the state-
ments intact.'
No reporter has the right to manipulate the words of others so as to convey im-
pressions that are distortions of the spirit of those words. You may misplace a
comma or substitute one adjective for another and still not alter the thrust of a
quote or paraphrase. But you have no license to violate the source's intent by
changing the meaning of what he said, no matter what motivation or tempta-
tion.'
However, by constitutionally allowing a journalist to rationally interpret
what a speaker said and then to place that interpretation within quota-
tion marks, the journalist is allowed to change the meaning, violate the
intent, and distort the spirit of the speaker's communication.' Such a
standard conflicts with the professional standards of journalism, the
rationale of New York Times, and the common law of libel.
MEDIA 70 (1976).
230. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1474. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Lipman, 'At the
New Yorke, Editor and a Writer Differ on the Facts,' WALL ST. J., June 18, 1984, at
1).
231. HULTENG, supra note 229, at 70.
232. Id at 71; see also Masson, 881 F.2d at 1474 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting
J. OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 100 (1988)) ('Not to clean up quotes is to make
intelligent speakers look stupid and stupid speakers look stupider."); DOUGLAS A. AN-
DERSON & BRUCE D. ITULE, WRITING THE NEWS 72 (1988) ("Generally, most editors
allow reporters to clean up grammar or to take out profanities in direct quotes.").
233. Masson, 881 F.2d at 1475 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
234. HULTENG, supra note 229, at 71.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
B. Rejection of the Dissent's Standard
Justice White's dissent in Masson, while unclear as to whether it
would allow grammar and word usage corrections, 7 concluded that
any deliberate or reckless alteration of a quotation is determinative in prov-
ing actual malice.' This standard coincides with professional journalis-
tic standards, but contradicts common law defamation principles.' The
majority opinion correctly pointed out that "[tlhe common law of libel
takes but one approach to the question of falsity regardless of the form
of the communication."' Minor inaccuracies in a factual statement are
overlooked and the focus of the inquiry is whether the statement is sub-
stantially true.' In establishing substantial truth, "it is not necessary to
establish the literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccura-
cies of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is
true in substance."'
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,' the Court refused "to create a
wholesale defamation, exemption for anything that might be labeled
'opinion. '"' Thus, if a statement is labeled an opinion and contains
false assertions of fact, that statement should be scrutinized under the
principles of common law libel, including the traditional test for falsi-
ty?A5
In Masson, the majority reasoned that the test for falsity is no different
when quotations are used.' The Court rejected "any special test of fal-
sity for quotations, including one which would draw a line at correction
of gr#mmar and syntax."" A statement is not substantially false "unless
it 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that
which the pleaded truth would have produced. '"' Under the dissent's
standard, minor cosmetic changes in a quotation, such as grammar and
237. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2437-39 (1991) (White,
J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting). For Justices White and Scalia, the fact that
Malcolm placed in quotes certain things she knew Masson did not say is, by any
definition of the term, a "knowing falsehood." Id. at 2437-38 (White, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 2431-33. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text
240. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
241. Id. at 2433.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. f (1977).
243. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
244. Id, at 2705.
245. Id.
246. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2432-33 (1991).
247. Id. at 2432.
248. Id. at 2433. (quoting R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 138
(1980)).
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syntax corrections, may or may not be actionable."' However, any de-
liberate alteration of a quotation beyond cosmetic corrections, such as
rewording, would definitely constitute actual malice, even though this
conclusion ignores the common law principle of substantial falsity.' If,
for example, a speaker tells a reporter "I killed him," but is quoted as
saying "I murdered him," the dissent would find this to be a deliberate
alteration constituting actual malice on the part of the reporter." How-
ever, if the speaker deliberately killed his victim, the reporter's alteration
of the quotation would still be substantially true under a common law
defamation analysis.' The dissent's standard is simply not in line with
the common law view of substantial falsity and, therefore, was properly
rejected by the majority of the Court.
Justice White's dissent is also contrary to the New York Times ratio-
nale. The central theme of the New York Times line of cases was the
Court's desire to give journalists and other non-fiction writers protection
from libel suits based on honest and inadvertent mistakes when writing
about public plaintiffs and matters of public concern.' This provides
"breathing space" for journalists who report on important public issues,
and discourages "self-censorship."' When the press has the peace of
mind of knowing that a lawsuit does not await after every factual mis-
take printed, it will be aggressive in providing the public with the infor-
mation needed for "uninhibited, robust, and wide open" debate.'s A
rule permitting a defamation action for every intentional misquotation of
a public plaintiff, no matter how minor, is inconsistent with the rationale
of New York Times.
Writers and reporters face practical dilemmas in capturing a speaker's
249. Id. at 2437-39 (White, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
251. See Lessner, supra note 103, at 195. Justice White recognized that some inten-
tional alterations may properly be summarily adjudicated. For example, if Malcolm
wrote that Masson wore contact lenses when in fact he said nothing about his eyes,
or if Malcohn wrote that Masson was spoiled as a child by his parents when in fact
Masson had said he had been spoiled by his mother, then the court might grant a
summary judgment because the statements were not defamatory. Masson, 111 S. Ct.
at 2438 (White, J., dissenting). But summary judgment was not proper in this case,
argued the dissent, because Malcolm's alterations did constitute actual malice. Id.
(White, J., dissenting).
252. Lessner, supra note 103, at 195. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying
text for the meaning of substantial falsity.
253. See supra notes 30-95 and accompanying text.
254. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-79 (1964).
255. Id, at 270.
exact words.' Rigorous deadlines, the need to take notes quickly dur-
ing an interview, and orators speaking from a distance contribute to the
difficulty of quoting someone verbatim."? To hold journalists to the
dissent's standard would force them to stand in front of a judge every
time a quotee with a grudge or a selective memory felt like suing.s The
result would be numerous lawsuits concerning word accuracy and a
forced transformation of journalistic standards and practices.'s Courts,
lawyers, and judges would limit journalistic and media flexibility in the
use of quotations, even though the altered quotations might have resulted
from a simple mistake and not an intentional misquotation.' The First
Amendment's protection of the "practice of journalism" would therefore
be weakened."
C. Acceptance of the Majority's Standard
The Supreme Court in Masson held that "a deliberate alteration of the
words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsi-
ty... unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning
conveyed by the statement." 2 By developing a standard that asks
whether the writer's quotation materially changed the meaning of the
speaker's actual statement, the Court established a standard that, unlike
its two counterparts previously discussed, is in line with the common
law principles of defamation and with the goals of New York Times.'
Since the late half of the sixteenth century, "the tort action for defama-
tion has existed to redress injury to the plaintiffs reputation by a state-
256. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1474 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting); HULTENG, supra note 229, at 70; James C. Goodale, A Sigh
of Relief, N.Y.U., June 28, 1991, at 2; David G. Savage, Writers Can't Recklessly Alter
Quotes, High Court Says, LA. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at A27.
257. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (1991); David
G. Savage, Writers Can't Recklessly Alter Quotes, High Court Says, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 1991, at A27.
258. See Press Ethics: Quotes ... (cf... and Don't Quotes), CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, June 27, 1991, at 20; Susan Ellicott, When Reporters Make Free With Speech,
THE TIMES (London), June 26, 1991, at 36.
259. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2431.
260. Adopting the standard that the dissent and the petitioner proposed may not
result in more libel judgments against journalists because the misquoted statements
may not be defamatory. See id. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting). However, to hold that
any deliberate or reckless alteration of a quotation beyond corrections for grammar
and syntax errors constitutes actual malice would encourage libel suits against jour-
nalists and other nonfiction writers who use quotations, thereby discouraging the use
of this literary instrument.
261. Id. at 2431.
262. Id.
263. Id at 2431-33.
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ment that is defamatory and false."' Unless a false quotation materially
alters the meaning of what the speaker actually said, in either substance
or manner of expression, the writer has done nothing to defame the
speaker.2 Without a material alteration, the speaker is not exposed to
"'hatred, contempt, ridicule... [or] obloquy,'" and the author has not
caused "'him to be shunned or avoided. '"' Additionally, if the quotation
has not materially changed the speaker's message, then whatever falsity
the quotation creates does not amount to substantial falsity. 7 Similarly,
if no material change in meaning has taken place, even if the actual
statement is altered beyond corrections for grammar and syntax errors,
the quotation is not substantially false.' The majority's standard recog-
nizes conmon law principles of libel, and thus eliminates the need for
the creation of a "discrete body of jurisprudence directed to this subject
alone."' •
Further, by requiring that the alteration be material and deliberate, the
Court created a standard consistent with New York Times.' The au-
thor of the materially false quotation must possess the necessary mental
state at the time of publication before the altered quotation will support
a finding of actual malice." The Court recognized that if the only re-
quirement for a libel action was a material change in the meaning creat-
ed by the quotations, irrespective of the author's intent, then the consti-
tutional protections that New York Times extended to journalists and
other non-fiction writers would be ignored.'
V. CASE IMPACT
A. Increase in Journalistic Credibility
Like other facets of American life, the news media has become in-
creasingly commercialized over the past two decades.2'h Because mod-
264. Id. at 2432. See also supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
265. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432.
266. Id. at 2429 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1982)).
267. Id. at 2431-32.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 2432.
270. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that
statements about public officials cannot constitute libel unless published with actual
malice: known falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
271. Id. at 280.
272. Masson, 111 S. Ct at 2429-33.
273. See Scott C. Herlihy, Comment, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: Actual
ern journalists often blend fact with fiction, inject large amounts of cre-
ativity into their work, and are profit-driven, the news media is partially
responsible for creating the public's mistrust of news and news report-
ingY This animosity is evidenced by the number of public figures who
have sued the media for printing allegedly false stories."' Johnny Car-
son,' Carol Burnett,' and General Westmoreland' are just a few
of the public plaintiffs who have sued over stories concerning their per-
sonal and private lives. The Supreme Court, however, in holding that
quotations must materially mean what the speaker said, may help reverse
this negative trend of increasing mistrust of the media
The primary beneficiary of the Masson ruling, besides the petitioner
himself, was the news media."' Not only did the Court's decision in
Masson give reporters room to interview sources and rework quotations
for clarity and style, but it also boosted the credibility of their profes-
sion.' In journalism, more than any other literary device, quotations
mean authority." "They are evidence for a reader that a story is real,
not something that is merely a fancy of people who have decided, for
whatever reason, to put out a newspaper."' Also, quotations, more
than any other part of an article, are what future historians rely on most
when using newspapers to reconstruct the past.' Therefore, their accu-
Malice and Direct Quotations-The Constitutional Right to Lie, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 564, 579-80 (1990) (arguing that the increased commercialization of the news
media supports 'strict protection of the integrity of direct quotations"). See generally
Richard A. Gonzales, Comment, Pyrrhic Victories and Glorious Defeats: When Defen-
dants Are Winning and Plaintifs Are Losing the Struggle Over Actual Malice and
"Fictionalized" Quotations, 22 ST. MARY'S U. 1037, 1053-57 (1991); Gail Appleson,
Court Decisions Could Open Door for Warfare Against Press, REUTERS, July 9, 1991,
at 22.
274. See Gonzales, supra note 273, at 1059-61.
275. See id. at 1060.
276. Id. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). Carson and
his second wife sued the newspaper after it had published a story accusing his
second wife of brealdng up his first marriage.
277. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
Burnett sued the National Enquirer over a story reporting she was drunk in public.
278. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). A former high-
-ranking officer in Vietnam sued CBS over a news program that implicated him in a
conspiracy to purposely conceal the strength of enemy troops.
279. See The Malcolm Decision, WASH. TIMES, June 24, 1991, at D2.
280. Id. See also Paul Gray, Justice Comes in Quotes: Journalists Can Tinker
With the Words of Interview Subjects-But Reckless Falsity Can Be Libelous, TIME,
July 1, 1991, at 68.
281. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (1991); The
Malcolm Decision, supra note 279, at D2. See generally HULTENG, supra note 229, at
70-71; ANDERSON & ITULE, supra note 232, at 69-73.
282. The Malcolm Decision, supra note 279, at D2.
283. See id.
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racy and validity are crucial. By denying constitutional protection to
journalists who place quotation marks around their own rational inter-
pretations of an interviewee's statements instead of around the speaker's
exact words or the material meaning of those words, the Court took a
significant step in keeping quotation marks credible and reliable. The
result is a strengthening of the media's credibility.
Furthermore, the Court's decision in Masson heightens the media's
role in promoting the exercise of the general public's First Amendment
rights. If a speaker has a First Amendment right to have his speech accu-
rately reproduced, and assuming society has the First Amendment right
to hear the speaker's ideas and not merely a reporter's rational interpre-
tation of them, then this decision strengthens the media's traditional role
of accurately informing the general populace.' When the media does
not properly perform this duty, the media loses the respect of the pub-
lic.a
B. Increase in Lawsuits Against the Media
Masson seems to open up a new area of liability for journalists who
quote public officials and public figures. By holding that any quotation
which materially changes the meaning of a quotee's statement is poten-
tially actionable, Masson may lead many public figures to take a second
look at what reporters are placing inside quotation marks.8
The Ninth Circuit's rational interpretation test obviously did not ex-
pose writers to high risk liability for misquoting public figures and offi-
cials. Because the Ninth Circuit laid down no guidelines for what consti-
tuted a "rational interpretation," the very ambiguity of this phrase gave
journalists significant room to defend against libel accusations. 7 But
the Court's standard in Masson is different. The changing of a single
284. Although the Court has never held that the media, as an institution, has a
constitutional role in informing the general public, traditionally the media has as-
sumed that role. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
285. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss 9 (1986) ("In recent years highly
publicized and embarrassing mistakes [by the media] have plagued even the most
estimable of media outlets.").
286. See James C. Goodale, A Sigh of Relief, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1991, at 2; David
Gonzales, Some Caution Greets Libel Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at A13.
287. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452, 1464 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinsld, J., dissenting) (arguing that the rational interpretation test denies public
plaintiffs a remedy).
word in a sentence or statement can easily change its meaning.' If a
speaker says "I killed him" and is quoted as saying "I murdered him," the
altered quotation would have materially changed the meaning of the
statement if the death had been an accident.'
In order to recover, the public plaintiff is nevertheless required to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant deliberately
altered the quotations.' ° Of course, the plaintiff must also survive the
defendant's motion for summary judgment." Many defamation cases
fail at the summary judgment stage because public plaintiffs are unable
to present clear and convincing evidence that would support a jury find-
ing that the defendant acted with actual malice. Further, the subjectivi-
ty of actual malice does not make this burden any easier to meet.m
Clearly, proving actual malice at the time of publication is easier when
the defendant is not under a working deadline and has adequate time to
study notes or listen to tapes of the plaintiffs interview, as in
Masson.' But presenting evidence of the defendant's state of mind, his
thoughts, intents, and motives at the time he published the questioned
statements has never been an easy task.29
C. Impact on Journalism Instruction
The impact of the Masson decision on how journalism schools and
programs instruct students to use quotations remains to be seen. Cur-
rently, journalism students are taught that "[quotation] marks around a
sentence mean that the words are exactly-or nearly exactly-what the
person said .... Quotations normally should [only] be corrected to avoid
the errors in grammar and word usage that often occur unnoticed when
288. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (1991) (White,
J., dissenting) (arguing that changing a single 'word in a sentence, if defamatory,
should be actionable).
289. See Lessner, supra note 103, at 195.
290. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86, (1964) (requiring
that actual malice be shown with "convincing clarity"); see also Gonzales, supra note
273, at 1048.
291. The party seeking a motion for summary judgment most show "that there is
not genuine issue of material fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Gonzales, supra
note 273, at 1048-49.
292. See Gonzales, supra note 273, at 1049 n.65 (citing a study that indicates that
between 1980 and 1981, 8396 of all defense motions concerning the issue of actual
malice were granted and that between 1982 and 1984, defamation defendants were
victorious on summary judgment motions 71% of the time).
293. See Gonzales, supra note 273, at 1050; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (demonstrating that the state of mind of the defendant is
key to proving actual malice).
294. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (1991).
295. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 120.
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someone is speaking but are embarrassing in print."' Students are in-
structed that when in doubt of the exact words a speaker used to ex-
press himself, paraphrase, do not quote. 7
These strict standards for quotations are taught to journalism students
and applied by the majority of working journalists, not so much because
members of the journalism profession are fearful of defamation suits, but
because such standards correspond with good journalism.' One com-
mentator remarked after the Masson decision, "The rules of good, jour-
nalism are stricter than the libel laws, and that remains the case after
this decision even with respect to the use of quotations."'
It must be remembered, however, that the majority of newspapers,
magazines, and television stations today must compete in a free market
and turn a profit if they wish to remain in existence." Therefore, no
matter what ideal concerning the use of quotations schools teach today
or in the future, the actual use of quotations outside of academic walls
may move towards taking advantage of the stylistic freedom the Masson
Court has given to writers who quote public figures. In the days to come,
the meaning of the words contained in quotation marks may be identical
to that expressed by the speaker's actual words-the language, however,
may be different.
VI. CONCLUSION
Seventy-three years ago, Justice Holmes stated in Abrams v. United
States, "[Tihe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas ... the best test for truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market."' However, reputations can
get damaged in Holmes' "marketplace of ideas." Therefore, a body of
296. ANDERSON & ITULE, supra note 232, at 72.
297. Id. at 73. See generally HULTENG, supra note 229, at 70-71.
298. See David Gonzalez, Some Caution Greets Libel Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1991, at A13. See generally HULTENG, supra note 229, at 70-71; ANDERSON & ITULE,
supra note 232, at 69-73.
299. David Gonzalez, Some Caution Greets Libel Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1991, at A13.
300. See Herlihy, supra note 273, at 579-80 (arguing that the more profit-oriented
the media becomes, the more creative it gets); see also SMOLLA, supra note 285, at
11-12 (observing that one component of contemporary journalism is pure entertain-
ment that makes substantial profits).
301. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
302. Id. at 630.
defamation law has developed over the decades to remedy that damage.
Every time the Supreme Court hears a defamation case, free speech and
reputation rights conflict. How these rights are balanced will often de-
termine the Court's decision. In Masson, the Court established a standard
that gives the media, and other critics of people in the public eye,
enough "breathing space" to continue to use quotations so that their
written work will not lose its credibility and longevity. Yet Masson did
not deprive those with public popularity of the ability to make their rep-
utations whole again after being misquoted. Whether Jeffrey Masson will
ultimately win his defamation suit against Janet Malcolm and The New
Yorker has yet to be seen. For public figures, the media, and the general
public, however, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. is a victory.
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